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In 2019, the Supreme Courts of both the United States and the United Kingdom decided 
cases involving the political question doctrine. In Rucho v. Common Cause, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims raise inherently political 
questions because the Court was unable to discern judicially manageable standards for 
determining when a partisan gerrymander had gone “too far.” Whereas, in R v. The Prime 
Minister (“Miller”), the United Kingdom Supreme Court adopted a narrower view of the 
political question doctrine, unanimously ruling that although the case involved political 
actors and the royal prerogative, it did not present a political question. The Court then 
proceeded to decide the case on the merits, holding that the Prime Minister exceeded his 
authority in prorogating Parliament before the Brexit deadline. The response of the 
judiciary—whether to abdicate or to intervene—presents a study in stark contrasts.  
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This paper evaluates Rucho by comparing the United States’ and United Kingdom’s 
respective political question doctrines through the lens of John Hart Ely’s 
representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review. According to Ely, the judiciary 
is uniquely competent to intervene like referees when one side gets an unfair 
advantage—not when the “wrong side” scores. Translated into legal theory, that means 
that when the political processes are undeserving of trust, either because certain groups 
are denied access or because representatives are operating in flagrant disregard of 
constituents’ interests, courts are fully capable of determining when the political 
branches have gone “too far.” Both cases illustrate why the Court’s duty to protect from 
state infringement individual liberties related to democratic participation is at its zenith 
when system failures denigrate the political process. In Rucho, the Court ignored this 
calling, abdicating its duty to intervene. Examining Miller reveals where the Court erred 
in Rucho: (1) Miller is an exemplar of the representation-reinforcement theory of judicial 
review, (2) Miller offers critical insights to contrast the Court’s approach in Rucho, and 
(3) Miller offers an example of “judicially manageable standards” for determining when 
a branch has exceeded the constitutional boundaries of its powers—a standard that the 
majority in Rucho so desperately seeks. At bottom, Rucho got it wrong—and Miller can 
help us see why. 
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A Comparative Study of the Political Question 
Doctrine in the Context of Political-System Failures: 
The United States and the United Kingdom 
 
 
“It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus 
be manipulated out of existence”* 
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Inconceivable no more. 2019 was a remarkable year in the world of political 
system failures. The United States Supreme Court decided Rucho v. Common Cause(1) 
which challenged partisan gerrymandering in North Carolina and Maryland, and held 
that all cases—now and forever—involving partisan gerrymandering claims are non-
justiciable political questions. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, relied 
heavily on the notion that political gerrymandering cases lacked “judicially manageable 
standards” to determine when a State has gone too far in drawing its districts on partisan 
lines.(2) These cases even had the proverbial smoking gun: legislators and members of 
 
* Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 230 (1962) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960)). I 
would like to express deep gratitude to my supportive friends, especially Joe Gu who assisted 
me in my research of U.K. law. And as always, words cannot suffice to express my thanks for 
Kerri Lawrence, my mom, who gives me strength and guidance in times it is needed most. 
(1) 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
(2) Id. at 2491. 
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the executive explicitly admitting an intent to draw voting districts in such a way as to 
deprive members of the opposing political party of any effective voice in the political 
process. But the Court abdicated its constitutional duty to prevent the State from 
infringing on the constitutional rights guaranteed to the People, under the guise of 
avoiding a confrontation with “the political thicket.”(3) 
In 2016, the British people voted to withdraw from the European Union (E.U.). 
Since then, the British Parliament has been attempting to negotiate a “Brexit” trade deal 
with the E.U. In August 2019, in anticipation of the no-deal Brexit deadline on October 
31, Prime Minister Boris Johnson asked Queen Elizabeth II to prorogue(4 ). Parliament 
for five weeks. In a normal political climate, prorogation does not provoke much of a 
reaction. But the length of this prorogation (which is unprecedented in modern 
history),(5) in the context of an impending no-deal Brexit and a Parliament fraught with 
political partisanship, Prime Minister Johnson’s recommendation ignited intense 
backlash from political allies and opposition alike. Gina Miller, a private citizen, and 
seventy-eight Members of Parliament challenged the prorogation in the U.K. courts.(6) 
Lower courts were split: one ruled on the merits,(7) and the other ruled that the case 
presented a non-justiciable political question.(8) Consolidated on appeal, the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court determined the cases to be within the scope of judicial 
review.(9 )Reaching the merits, the Court pronounced that the prorogation frustrated 
 
(3) Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to enter this political thicket” 
because it is the proper role of Congress to remedy unfairness in districting.).  
(4) In exercise of her royal prerogative and on the advice of the Privy Counsel, the Crown may 
prorogate, or suspend, a session of Parliament. See R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime 
Minister [2019] UKSC 41 [3]. Prorogation is not to be confused with the dissolution of parliament, 
which immediately precedes a general election. See id. at [4].  
(5) From 1999 to 2017, the average length of a single prorogation was eight calendar days. For the 
full report detailing lengths of prorogations from 1900 to 2017, see M. PURVIS, Lengths of 
Prorogation since 1900, U.K. Parliament: House of Lords Libr. (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/LLN-2019-0111#fullreport. 
This is by no means the longest prorogation in British history, however. That title remains with 
Charles I, who, in 1629, prorogued Parliament until 1640. See A. SARMA, Political Prorogation: What 
Are the Implications for British Politics?, Harv. Pol. Rev. (Oct. 12, 2019), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20200617164131/https://harvardpolitics.com/world/british-
prorogation/. 
(6 )A. SARMA, supra note 5.  
(7) J. CHERRY, QC MP and Others for Judicial Review [2019] CSOH 70 (Scot.). 
(8) R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB). 
(9) R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 [52] (“[T]he courts can rule 
on the extent of prerogative powers.”) (hereinafter  Miller).  
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“the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the Government to account” without 
reasonable justification.(10) The Court thus nullified the prorogation.(11 ) 
John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review helps to 
distinguish the role of courts envisioned in Rucho and Miller. His theory is thus: the 
courts should act like referees, intervening when one side gets an unfair advantage, not 
when the “wrong side” scores. (12) This means that when the political processes are 
undeserving of trust, either because certain groups are denied access or because 
representatives are operating in flagrant disregard of constituents’ interests, courts are 
uniquely competent to intervene.(13) 
This note compares the respective political question doctrines of the United 
States and the United Kingdom to evaluate Rucho(14) through Ely’s representation-
reinforcement theory of judicial review. Rucho and Miller present instances of political 
system failures,(15) involving one branch’s attempt to accrete power and usurp the 
democratic process. Both cases illustrate why the Court’s duty to protect individual 
liberties from state infringement is at its zenith when system failures denigrate the 
political process. That calling is all the more critical when the individual liberty at stake 
is meaningful participation in the process itself. In Rucho, the Court ignored this calling, 
abdicating its duty to intervene. Examining Miller reveals where the Court erred in 
Rucho: (1) Miller is an exemplar of the representation-reinforcement theory of judicial 
review, (2) Miller offers critical insights to contrast the Court’s approach in Rucho, and 
(3) Miller offers an example of “judicially manageable standards” for determining when 
a branch has exceeded the constitutional boundaries of its powers—a standard that the 
majority in Rucho so desperately seeks. At bottom, Rucho got it wrong and Miller can 
help us see why.  
Rucho was decided recently, so legal academia has not yet had the opportunity 
to respond thoroughly. The decision has received some attention from academics thus 
far,(16) but nearly all of it is confined to commentary in the popular media.(17) Miller, 
 
(10) Id. at [55], [58–61].  
(11) Id. at [70].  
(12) J. H. ELY, infra note 171, at 102–03. 
(13) Id. 
(14) Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
(15) Defined infra III.A.  
(16) See, e.g., G. CHARLES & L. E. FUENTES-ROHWER, Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy in 
Rucho v. Common Cause, in Am. Const. Soc’y Sup. Ct. Rev. 2018–19 (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/dirty-thinking-about-law-and-
democracy-in-rucho-v-common-cause/.  
(17) See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court just abdicated its most important role: 
enforcing the Constitution, in L.A. Times (June 27, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-
ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-supreme-court-gerrymandering-20190627-story.html; C. FRIED, A Day of 
Sorrow in American Democracy, The Atlantic (July 3, 2019), 
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however, has received relatively more attention from academia.(18) Still, the existing 
literature on either side of the pond has not fully incorporated lessons from the field of 
comparative law. Only one scholar has undertaken a comparative study of the political 
question doctrine in the United States and the United Kingdom, but her work focused 
primarily on the Israeli doctrine as the analytical interlocutor.(19) This paper aims to fill 
the gap: compare the respective doctrines, draw insights from the U.K. political question 
doctrine as seen in Miller, and use those insights to inform a discussion of the political 
question doctrine in cases of political system failures, focusing on Rucho. 
This Note first briefly introduces the origins of the political question doctrine in 
the United States (I.A.), presents the U.S. Supreme Court’s modern formulation (I.B.), 
and discusses the political gerrymandering caselaw predating Rucho (I.C.). It briefly 
presents the argument for a comparative study (II.A.). It then explains the origins (II.B.) 
and modern formulation of the United Kingdom’s political question doctrine (II.C.), 
closing with a thorough discussion of Miller (II.D.). The analysis section first explores 
Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review and defines “political-
system failures” (III.A). Then, it applies the representation-reinforcement theory to 
Rucho and Miller, explaining why each fits the definition of a political system failure 
(III.B.). Using insights gleaned from Miller, the paper proposes judicially manageable 
standards for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims and explains why courts are 
institutionally competent to adjudicate them (III.C.). And finally, it responds to 
anticipated criticisms (III.D.).  
 
 






(18) See generally S. SHIRAZI, The U.K.’s Marbury v. Madison: The Prorogation Case and How Courts 
Can Protect Democracy, in U. Ill. L. Rev. Online 108 (2019) (comparing and contrasting Miller with 
Marbury v. Madison and discussing the implications of Prorogation on the U.K.’s attempt to leave 
the E.U.).  
(19) See generally M. COHN, Form, Formula, and Constitutional Ethos: The Political 
Question/Justiciability Doctrine in Three Common Law Systems, in 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 675 (2011). Other 
scholars have undertaken comparative analyses between the political question doctrines of the 
U.S. and Israel and the U.S. and South Africa, respectively. See generally E. GILL, Judicial Answer 
to Political Question: The Political Question Doctrine in the United States and Israel, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L. 
J. 245 (2014); M. MHANGO, Is It Time for a Coherent Political Question Doctrine in South Africa? Lessons 
from the United States, 7 Afr. J. Legal Stud. 457 (2014).  
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The traditional view among scholars (20) is that the American political question 
doctrine was first proclaimed in Marbury v. Madison. In that opinion, Chief Justice 
Marshall pronounced that “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.” (21) 
It remained for the Court to determine whether an issue raised a political question—one 
that only the political branches were equipped to decide—or one over which the Court 
could exercise its power of judicial review.(22)  Chief Justice Marshall identified some 
guidelines in determining whether a question was “political in nature”: “The subjects 
are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights” and arise from those parts 
of the Constitution which empower the political branches to exercise their discretion.(23) 
Further, the Court provided examples of what would constitute quintessentially political 
questions: (1) the President exercising his power of appointment and nominating a 
candidate for the Senate’s approval, and (2) acts of an officer of the Executive pertaining 
to foreign affairs and complying with direct orders from the President.(24) Marshall 
noted, however, that certain actions by an executive officer acting on behalf of the 
President would be reviewable by the courts “when [a government officer] is directed 
peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on 
the performance of those acts; he is . . . amenable to the laws for his conduct, and cannot 
at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.”(25) In short, the Court had no 
power to review Executive actions that did not implicate individual rights.  
Marbury’s logic was rooted in separation of powers principles. In accepting the 
decisions of the political branches as binding, the judiciary exercised deference and 
 
(20) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For the traditional view, see, e.g., R. E. BARKOW, More Supreme 
than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, in 102 Colum. 
L. Rev. 237, 248–50 (2002) (noting that Marbury marked the first pronouncement of the Political 
Question Doctrine in American jurisprudence); M. D. GOUIN, United States v. Alvarez Machain: 
Waltzing with the Political Question Doctrine, in 26 Conn. L. Rev. 759, 763–64 (1994) (noting that the 
Political Question Doctrine was born from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury); J. PETER 
MULHERN, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, in 137 Penn. L. Rev. 97, 102 (1988) (“The 
political question doctrine stems from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.”). 
But see generally T. LEIGH GROVE, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, in 90 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1908 (2015) (criticizing the traditional understanding of the doctrine’s origins and proposing 
instead that the current doctrine “was not created until the mid-twentieth century, when it was 
employed by the Supreme Court to entrench, rather than to undermine, its emerging supremacy 
over constitutional law.”).  
(21) Id. at 170.  
(22) Id. at 167, 170–71.  
(23) Id. at 166, 170.  
(24) Id. at 166–67.  
(25) Id. at 166 (emphasis added).  
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respected institutional competencies.(26) Deference precluded courts from substituting 
their own preferences for those of the political branches—they could exercise only their 
judgment and not their will.(27) According to Chief Justice Marshall, the judiciary is 
empowered only to declare what the law is—not decide what the law should be.(28) 
Finally, the concept of political accountability underpins much of the Court’s 
logic in Marbury: By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with 
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own 
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own 
conscience.”(29) The Constitution affords the President the authority to make political 
decisions, and if the people—from whom the Constitution itself derives supreme 
authority—disagree with the President’s choices, they have full recourse to express their 
discontentment through the political process.(30) Therefore, when the decisions were 
political and did not infringe on individual rights, judicial review was unnecessary to 
curtail a rogue Executive. Similarly, the argument goes, Congress is elected by the people 
and is thus directly accountable to them should it fail to adequately represent their 
interests. These principle considerations similarly underpin the British political question 
doctrine.(31)  
 
B. The Modern U.S. Political Question Doctrine  
The justifications for the modern political question doctrine remain the same. 
First, it is predicated on horizontal separation of powers. There are certain judgments 
that the political branches are both constitutionally entitled and functionally more 
competent to make. Second, judicial review is the inappropriate avenue for redress 
(unless the dispute involves individual rights) because representatives are accountable 
to their constituents through the traditional political process.  
The Court announced the modern formulation of the political question doctrine 
test in Baker v. Carr.(32) In Baker, plaintiffs challenged the Tennessee legislature’s 
apportionment of voting districts on Equal Protection(33) grounds, alleging that the 
 
(26) See id. at 165–66 (noting that the Constitution entrusted the President with certain powers to 
be exercised at his discretion).  
(27) See id. at 170–71, 177. 
(28) See id. at 177–78 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”). 
(29) Id. at 165–66. 
(30) Id. at 166 (“[I]n cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, 
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.” (emphasis 
added)).  
(31) Discussed infra Section II. 
(32) Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
(33) “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.  
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current apportionment effectively debased their votes of any value because Tennessee 
had not reevaluated its voting districts to account for significant demographic changes 
that had occurred over the past sixty years.(34) The Court held that the case did not 
present a nonjusticiable political question and ruled on the merits.(35) Writing for the 
majority, Justice Brennan noted that “the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a 
political right does not mean it presents a political question.”(36) Furthermore, “the right 
to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the 
discrimination relates to political rights.”(37 )Although the Court did not find this case to 
present a nonjusticiable political question, it set forth the contours of the doctrine.(38)  
The political question doctrine is a “function of the [horizontal] separation of 
powers” between the judiciary and the political branches of the federal government.(39) 
And although it remains the province of the courts to interpret the Constitution and 
determine when a branch has exceeded its authority, some exercises of constitutional 
authority fall outside the scope of judicial review.(40))The Court refused to erect 
categorical barriers to judicial review in certain subject-matter areas, like foreign 
affairs,(41) and instead opted for case-by-case inquiry.(42) Cases involving any of the 
following elements may present nonjusticiable political questions: [1] a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.(43) 
This formulation is a chimera of both textual(44) and prudential (45) 
considerations. Baker, however, provided no guidance as to how these factors would 
 
(34) Baker, 369 U.S. at 193–94. 
(35) Id. at 199–200. 
(36) Id. at 209. 
(37) Id. at 210 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944)) (internal quotations omitted).  
(38) Id. 
(39) Id. 
(40) Id. at 211. 
(41) See id. (“Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).  
(42) Id. at 210–11.  
(43) Id. at 217. 
(44) See id. (For example, “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue”).  
(45) See id. (For example, “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments”).  
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apply to future cases, how the Court should weigh the factors relative to one another, or 
if and when any of them would be dispositive. It is no surprise, then, that future courts 
filled in the gaps. 
 
C. The U.S. Political Question Doctrine and Gerrymandering Cases 
Gerrymandering refers to “the practice of dividing a geographical area into 
electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair 
advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”(46 ). As Chief Justice Roberts 
noted in Rucho v. Common Cause, gerrymandering has a long and sordid history in United 
States politics.(47) Over the course of the twentieth century, the Court resolved cases 
involving racial and partisan gerrymandering, paralleling a representation-reinforcing 
approach to judicial review.48 For example, the Court held that constitutional challenges 
to the apportionment of districts based on population were subject to judicial review.(49) 
In cases asserting racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has never once ruled that the 
issue presented a nonjusticiable political question.(50) And in the realm of partisan 
gerrymandering, the Court had previously found these cases to be justiciable, escaping 
the political question doctrine’s kiss of death. But the twenty-first century proved too 
much for partisan gerrymandering claims, with Rucho delivering the fatal blow. 
Baker held that the parties had standing to challenge the state’s districting 
scheme on equal protection grounds (in addition to laying out the modern Political 
Question Doctrine test).(51) Although Baker did not involve state discrimination on the 
 
(46) Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999).   
(47) Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019). 
(48) See J. H. ELY, infra note 171, at 87. 
(49) See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016) (holding unanimously that in accordance 
with the Equal Protection Clause’s “one-person, one-vote” principle, the state may design its 
voting districts based on the state’s total population); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) 
(striking down New Jersey’s apportionment plan as violating the Apportionment Clause (U.S. 
CONST. Art. I § 2) because the State failed to make a good faith effort to achieve as near to 
population equality as is practicable); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding 
districts in Connecticut on the grounds that exact mathematical parity for the districts was not 
required); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that because “[l]egislators represent 
people, not trees or acres,” both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned according to 
population, and the state is required to reevaluate its districts to account for population changes 
at least every ten years); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (ruling that electoral districts must 
be drawn so that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is worth 
as much as another’s”).  
(50) See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42 (1986) (holding that vote dilution on racial 
grounds violated the Equal Protection Clause).  
(51) See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (“the appellants have standing to challenge the 
Tennessee apportionment statutes.”). Apportionment refers to “the allocation of congressional 
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basis of political affiliation, it laid the groundwork for the cases to come. Gaffney v. 
Cummings was the next important case in the partisan gerrymandering saga.(52) In 
Gaffney, Connecticut adopted a policy of “political fairness,” which aimed to apportion 
the districts to affect “proportional representation of the two major political parties” in 
the state’s House and Senate.(53) Voters challenged that policy as violating the Equal 
Protection Clause.(54) In other words, the policy aimed to structure voting districts so the 
resulting composition of both houses would reflect “as closely as possible . . . the actual 
[statewide] plurality of votes on the House or Senate lines in a given election.”(55) The 
Apportionment Board determined the appropriate ratio of Republican to Democrat 
seats, based not on party membership within the respective districts, but rather on the 
party voting results in the past three statewide elections.(56) The Court ruled that the 
“political fairness” plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because aiming to 
provide proportional representation to its constituents based on political party affiliation 
was a legitimate state interest.(57) Underlying the Court’s reasoning is the notion that 
giving people fair representation in the state legislature is not depriving them of 
anything. Quite the contrary—the plan safeguards the potency of each vote from 
dilution. Finally, Gaffney noted that districting plans “may be vulnerable [to equal 
protection challenges] if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political 
process and their voting strength invidiously minimized,”(58) a prescient foreshadowing 
of the claims presented in Davis v. Bandemer.(59) 
In Bandemer, citizens of Indiana claimed that by diluting the votes of Democrats, 
the state’s apportionment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.(60) Bandemer held 
that partisan gerrymandering claims did not present “political questions” and were thus 
justiciable in federal courts as equal protection claims.(61) Justice White, again writing for 
the majority, acknowledged several cases in which the Court had summarily affirmed 
lower rulings that equal protection claims involving partisan gerrymandering were 
nonjusticiable.(62) But the Court effectively disposed of them as nonbinding precedent, 
 
representatives among the states based on population, as required by the 14th Amendment.” 
Apportionment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
(52) 412 U.S. 735 (1973).  
(53) Id. at 738. 
(54) Id.  
(55) Id. (quoting testimony in the record).  
(56) Id. 
(57) Id. at 754. 
(58) Id. (emphasis added). 
(59) 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
(60) Id. at 113.  
(61) Id. at 124. 
(62) Bandemer, 478 U.S at 120 (citing WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), summarily aff’g 238 
F.Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)). 
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instead reasoning by analogy that because population apportionment and racial 
gerrymandering claims were justiciable, partisan gerrymandering claims must be too.(63) 
The Court then applied the Baker test, finding none of the factors determinative of a 
political question.(64) Reaching the merits, the Court refused to distinguish the claims of 
political groups from those of racial minorities, whose claims the Court regularly held 
to be justiciable.(65) Acknowledging that members of political parties had not been 
subject the same stigma over the course of history as racial minorities, nor was affiliation 
with a political group an immutable characteristic, the Court was unpersuaded that 
these distinctions warranted a finding of non-justiciability.(66) Bandemer established the 
test for establishing a prima facie equal protection claim in political gerrymandering 
cases: plaintiffs must show an “intentional discrimination against an identifiable 
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”(67) Reiterating, the 
Court stated, “where unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide 
political gerrymandering, the mere lack of proportional representation will not be 
sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination.”(68) To establish a claim, plaintiffs 
would have to show that the apportionment would “consistently degrade . . . a group of 
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”(69) 
In concurrence, Justice O’Connor advocated that there is no need for judicial 
intervention, much less a constitutional justification for it, because partisan 
gerrymandering is a “self-limiting enterprise” and that “[t]here is no proof before us that 
political gerrymandering is an evil that cannot be checked or cured by the people or by 
the parties themselves.”(70) Justice O’Connor would have treated the claim as a 
nonjusticiable political question, not because the subject was political in nature, but 
because the political processes can adequately curb any constitutional violation.(71) 
Justice O’Connor’s objections in Bandemer would lay the groundwork for the plurality in 
Vieth v. Jubelirer (72) and the majority in Rucho.(73)  
The plaintiffs in Vieth challenged Pennsylvania’s newly drawn electoral districts, 
alleging that they amounted to unconstitutional political gerrymanders in violation of 
 
(63) Id. at 121. 
(64) Id. at 122. 
(65) Id. at 125. 
(66) Id. 
(67) Id. at 127. For John Hart Ely’s discussion and critique of Bandemer, see Gerrymanders: The Good, 
The Bad and The Ugly, in 50 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 616–23 (1998).  
(68) Bandemer, 478 U.S at 132. 
(69) Id.  
(70) Id. at 152. (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
(71) Id. at 144–46, 155. 
(72) 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
(73) 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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the Equal Protection Clause.(74) In a 4-1-4 split, the Court held that unless plaintiffs could 
identify judicially manageable standards for determining when a constitutional 
violation had occurred, partisan gerrymandering claims presented a nonjusticiable 
political question.(75) Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, argued that partisan 
gerrymandering cases were categorically non-justiciable political questions.(76) The 
Scalia plurality justified overturning Bandemer on the grounds that in the eighteen years 
since that decision was announced, courts had not successfully identified a consistent, 
manageable standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.(77) In short, the plurality’s concerns were prudential ones.  
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, providing the fifth vote necessary to 
resolve the case. He wrote that the Court should not adopt a categorical rule for partisan 
gerrymandering cases, but should instead rule narrowly that the present case was not 
justiciable for want of judicially manageable standards.(78) Vieth left the door open for 
future litigants to claim equal protection violations in partisan gerrymandering claims 
and invited them to propose judicially manageable standards.(79) Therefore, although it 
has been argued that Vieth effectively overturned Bandemer, that would not formally 
occur until Rucho.  
In bitter dissent, Justice Stevens advocated that “it would be contrary to 
precedent and profoundly unwise to foreclose all judicial review of [partisan 
gerrymandering] claims that might be advanced in the future.”(80) Justice Stevens would 
have affirmed Bandemer and its predecessors and held that the same “judicially 
manageable standard[s]” used in racial gerrymandering cases should apply to “other 
species of gerrymanders.”(81) For Justice Stevens, discriminating on party lines instead 
of racial ones would not remedy the district’s constitutional deficiency.(82) Instead, 
Justice Stevens would have adhered to the following standard: “If no neutral criterion 
can be identified to justify the lines drawn, and if the only possible explanation for a 
 
(74) Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the one-person-one-vote principle in 
Article I, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, but they are not relevant to the discussion here. Id. 
(75) Id. at 281.  
(76) Id. 
(77) Id. at 279. 
(78) Id. at 309–10 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In accordance with the Marks rule, which requires that 
the holding in a plurality case be limited to the narrowest grounds of agreement between the 
concurrence and the plurality, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controls. Marks v. United States, 430 
U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
(79) See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (“If workable standards do emerge to measure . . . burdens, however, 
courts should be prepared to order relief.”) 
(80) Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
(81) Id. at 318, 320, 336.  
(82) Id. 
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district’s bizarre shape is a naked desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational 
basis exists to save the district from an equal protection challenge.”(83)  
 
D. The Political Question Doctrine Applied: Rucho v. Common Cause  
And finally, equal protection claims for partisan gerrymandering reached their 
final resting place in Rucho. Voters in Maryland and North Carolina brought equal 
protection challenges, among others, to the voting districts in their respective state.(84) In 
North Carolina, the record clearly demonstrated that Republican leadership intended to 
dilute the voting strength of Democratic constituents in the state.(85) A member of the 
redistricting committee stated, “I think electing Republicans is better than electing 
Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”(86) 
The map chosen predicted the election of ten Republicans and three Democrats, and that 
was the exact result in 2016 and 2018.(87) And in Maryland, Governor O’Malley sought 
to redraw the districts to flip one Republican stronghold to a Democrat seat, making the 
tally seven Democrats to one Republican.(88) He later admitted that entrenching 
Democratic power was his purpose for the redistricting effort.(89) And again, the 
gerrymander worked exactly as predicted—the election resulted in seven Democrats 
and one Republican, despite no major population or demographic shifts in the state’s 
electorate.(90) 
Writing for the Rucho majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that “partisan 
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal 
courts.”(91) The holding is predicated on three principles: (1) “the Constitution supplies 
no objective measure for assessing whether a districting map treats a political party 
fairly,”(92) (2) the Founders were well aware of gerrymandering problems but allocated 
redistricting authority to the political branches anyway, thereby depriving courts of 
oversight,(93) and (3) that states are the more appropriate fora to deal with the 
problem.(94) The fundamental holding in Rucho is that the Court was unable to find 
judicially manageable legal standards for determining when an electoral map has gone 
 
(83) Id. at 339.  
(84) Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019). 
(85) Id.  
(86) Id. 
(87) Id. 
(88) Id. at 2493.  
(89) Id. 
(90) Id. 
(91) Id. at 2506–07. 
(92) Id. at 2501. 
(93) Id. at 2496.  
(94) Id. at 2507–08.  
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too far.(95)The majority expressed concerns that if courts adjudicated partisan 
gerrymandering claims without such rules, they could impose their own visions of 
“fairness” on the electoral map.(96) Finally, the Chief Justice stated that securing partisan 
advantage in drawing electoral maps is a permissible government objective.(97) But in a 
feat of mental gymnastics, he also purported not to condone excessive partisan 
gerrymandering, while depriving the courts of a voice in the matter altogether.(98)  
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, excoriated the 
majority for abdicating its constitutional obligation to declare the law.99 The dissent 
contended that extreme partisan gerrymanders amount to constitutional violations: 
“districters . . . set out to reduce the weight of certain citizens’ votes . . . thereby 
depriv[ing] them of their capacity to ‘full[y] and effective[ly] participat[e] in the political 
process[].’”(100) At bottom, vote dilution on the basis of someone’s political affiliation 
frustrates their ability to participate equally and meaningfully in popular elections. The 
dissent looked to state courts and found, contrary to what the majority would have us 
believe, that states have successfully crafted “neutral and manageable and strict 
standards” without “a shred of politics about them” for evaluating partisan 
gerrymandering claims.101 Those tests look to (1) intent (was the state officials’ 
“predominant purpose” in drawing the lines to “entrench their party in power” by 
diluting opposition voters?),(102) (2) effects (did the lines, in fact, substantially dilute 
opponents’ votes?),(103) and (3) causation (if plaintiffs make a prima facie case on the first 
two elements, can the State provide a legitimate, non-partisan justification for the 
map?).(104) These tests are the sort of thing, the dissent argued, that courts work with 
every day.(105) The dissent naturally posed the question, If they can do it, why can’t 
we?(106) The dissent also rejected the majority’s claim that any findings of constitutional 
violations would be “mere prognostications” about the future, instead declaring that 
lower courts have grounded their determinations on concrete evidence of past, present, 
and future constitutional harms in the form of vote dilution.(107) Finally, the dissent 
argued that partisan gerrymandering threatens the very foundation of representative 
 
(95) Id. at 2500–01.  
(96) Id. at 2499–500. 
(97) Id. at 2503. 
(98) Id. at 2507. 
(99) Id. at 2525 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
(100) Id. at 2514 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)).  
(101) Id. at 2525. 
(102) Id. at 2516 (quoting Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. ___ (2015)).  
(103) Id. at 2516. 
(104) Id.  
(105) Id.  
(106) Id. at 2524.  
(107) Id. at 2519. 
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democracy—it is “anti-democratic in the most profound sense.”(108) The State’s power 
emanates from the people. Its legitimacy requires that its constituents have a meaningful 
choice in who represents them.(109) Political gerrymandering deprives certain 
constituents of that choice, allows leaders to entrench themselves in power, and 
“imperil[s] our system of government.”(110) 
 
 
II. The Political Question Doctrine in the United Kingdom 
 
A. The value of comparative analysis and why the U.K. is an appropriate 
comparison 
Critics of the field of comparative constitutional law regularly object to using 
foreign sources in interpreting U.S. constitutional law on the grounds that the United 
States does “not have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and 
never ha[s]”(111) and that the notion that “American law should conform to the laws of 
the rest of the world ought to be rejected out of hand.”(112) But because the U.S. and U.K. 
political question doctrines share the same basic principles, and both countries are facing 
similar legal and political challenges, that criticism bears limited weight here. The 
doctrinal similarities between the two provide a sound basis for comparative analysis. 
And although the structure of their respective constitutional systems may differ, both 
countries share the concept of judicial review and cordon off certain policy areas as “non-
 
(108) Id. at 2525. 
(109) Id. (citing Alexander Hamilton, 2 Debates on the Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1891)).  
(110) Id. at 2525.  
(111) Justice Scalia persistently objected to the Court’s citation or reference to foreign caselaw in its 
own constitutional decision-making. Potent in his reasoning is an element of American 
exceptionalism: that the United States is distinct in its legal history, philosophy, and identity, and 
as such, no other legal system in the world is comparable. Justice Scalia’s categorical rejection of 
using foreign law also relies on two other principles: first, he sees it as an affront to the democratic 
principle of popular sovereignty: doubting “whether [the American people] would say ‘Yes, we 
want to be governed by the views of foreigners,’” having not adopted their laws through the 
traditional democratic process. Second, he challenges the criteria on which judges select foreign 
law for support: “[w]hen it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, we use the 
foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree we don’t use it.” For the full interview, see The Relevance 
of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 519 (2005).  
(112) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court's discussion of these foreign views . . . 
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since “this Court[] . . . should not 
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n.1 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
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justiciable.”(113) What’s more, both nations’ philosophies about judicial review of 
political questions are predicated on separation of powers principles and concerns about 
institutional competence.  
 
B. The U.K. Political Question Doctrine: Foundations  
The political question doctrine in the U.K. is simply referred to as non-
justiciability. The principle of justiciability is “not one of discretion, but . . . inherent in 
the very nature of the judicial process,”(114) meaning that by imposing restrictions on 
themselves, courts recognize “the limits of judicial expertise and . . . the proper 
demarcation between the role of the courts and the responsibilities of the executive” in 
the constitutional order.(115) Put simply, courts acknowledge that the political branches 
may be more competent to make certain decisions, and in those instances, courts bow 
out, deferring to those decisions. As Lord Sumption declared, “[t]o say that an issue is 
nonjusticiable is to say that there is a rule of law that the courts may not decide it.”(116) 
Indeed, U.K. Courts also look for “judicially manageable standards” to guide such a 
decision.(117) And like the U.S. doctrine, whether a question is justiciable is determined 
on a case-by-case basis.(118) Before 1984, all cases involving the royal prerogative were 
categorically exempt from judicial review.(119) 
 
C. The Modern U.K. Political Question Doctrine 
The modern British political question doctrine was pronounced in Civil Service 
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, commonly referred to as the GCHQ case.(120) 
Prior to that decision, any use of the royal prerogative was non-justiciable. The royal 
prerogative exists as a matter of historical gloss and common law and refers to powers 
 
(113) This pattern is particularly notable in cases challenging executive foreign affairs powers—
namely, the use of military force and treatymaking power. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (“[I]t is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation . . . 
which challenges the legality, the wisdom or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending 
our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.”); Blackburn v Attorney General [1971] 2 All 
ER 1380 (Lord Denning holding that an exercise of the prerogative power of the Crown in the 
making of treaties “cannot be challenged or questioned in these courts”).  
(114) See Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No.3), [1982] A.C. 888, 932 (Lord Wilberforce).  
(115) D. MCGOLDRICK, The Boundaries of Justiciability, in 58 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 981, 984 (2010).  
(116) Lord Sumption, Foreign Affairs in the English Courts since 9/11, Lecture at the Dep’t of Gov’t, 
London Sch. of Econ. (May 14, 2012) https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_120514.pdf 
[hereinafter Lord Sumption Speech].  
(117) MCGOLDRICK, supra note 119, at 986.  
(118) Id. at 987.  
(119) Lord Sumption Speech, supra note 120. For a full discussion on the history of judicial review 
in U.K. courts, see T. T. ARVIND & L. STIRTON, The Curious Origins of Judicial Review, 133 Sussex L. 
Rev. Q. 91 (2017) http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/59837/1/paper%20v5-TTA.pdf. 
(120) [1985] AC 374 (HL) [hereinafter GCHQ]. 
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that only the Crown may exercise.(121) Today, “Government Ministers exercise the 
majority of the prerogative powers either in their own right or through the advice they 
provide to the Queen which she is bound constitutionally to follow.”(122) It endows them 
with various powers—from declaring war to appointing and dismissing ministers.(123) 
GCHQ involved the use of the royal prerogative: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and 
her Government, purportedly acting in the interest of national security, prohibited 
employees of the Government Communications Headquarters from joining trade 
unions.(124) Because prerogative powers developed in the common law and are not 
codified in statute, any changes in the power of review would have to come from the 
courts.(125) The appellate court held that the use of the royal prerogative in the national 
security arena precluded judicial review.(126) The House of Lords, the highest court in 
the United Kingdom at the time, ruled that exercises of the Royal Prerogative were 
justiciable but carved out several areas as immune from review.(127) Lord Diplock’s 
opinion in GCHQ is widely viewed as the basis for the modern rule.(128) In that opinion, 
Diplock eschewed the prototypical approach, which distinguished justiciability of 
prerogative actions based on the “legal nature, boundaries and historical origin of ‘the 
prerogative . . . .’”(129) Instead, GCHQ held that the question of justiciability is 
determined by the case’s subject-matter: Cases involving executive functions remained 
outside the scope of the courts’ review.(130) The modern formulation of the British 
Political Question Doctrine depends on the “subject matter and suitability in the 
particular case.”(131)  Outside the scope of judicial review lies “[p]rerogative powers such 
as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of 
mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of 
ministers . . . because their nature and subject matter are such as not to be amenable to 
 
(121) G. BARTLETT & M. EVERETT, U.K. House of Commons Libr., Briefing Paper No. 03861, The Royal 
Prerogative 5 (2017). The Crown refers to both the Sovereign (i.e., the Queen) and Government 
Ministers. 
(122) Id. at 3.  
(123)Q&A: Royal Prerogative, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4267761.stm.  
(124) GCHQ, [1985] AC 374 (HL). 
(125) Id. 
(126) Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] I.R.L.R. 353. 
(127) GCHQ, [1985] AC 374 (HL).  






(131) R (Abbasi & Anor.) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs & Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598, [2003] UKHRR 76 [85]. 
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the judicial process.”(132) GCHQ came as quite a surprise and vastly expanded the scope 
of judicial review. It remains the seminal case on judicial review of prerogative powers. 
 
D. The U.K. Political Question Doctrine in Practice: The Prorogation Case 
In 2019, the United Kingdom Supreme Court decided Miller.(133) Understanding 
the political context surrounding the case is critical. In a 2016 popular referendum, the 
British people voted to leave the European Union (E.U.).(134) “Brexit,” as it has become 
commonly known, is a highly contentious and partisan issue in the United Kingdom. 
The U.K. Government and the E.U. had been actively engaged in negotiations for a Brexit 
deal since the 2016 referendum. (135) The U.K. has since “Brexited” the E.U., but trade 
talks are ongoing.(136)  
Upon the formation of a new government in July 2019, the parties stipulated that 
if they could not come to an agreement before October 31, 2019, there would be a “no-
deal” Brexit, and the United Kingdom would simply drop out of the E.U.(137) This would 
have meant that the two entities would automatically “divorce” on this date without any 
agreements on trade, security and the like.(138) A no-deal Brexit would have posed 
potentially serious ramifications for the political and economic stability of Europe. Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson, who took office in July 2019, openly advocated for a no-deal 
Brexit.(139)  
 
(132) GCHQ [1985] AC at [417–18].  
(133) Miller, [2019] UKSC 41.  
(134) S. ERLANGER, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y. Times (June 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-european-union-
referendum.html. 
(135) B. MUELLER, What is Brexit? A Simple Guide to Why It Matters and What Happens Next, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/what-is-
brexit.html. Negotiators reached a provisional agreement on October 17, 2019, but this deal must 
be agreed to by E.U. leaders and British Parliament. As of June 3, 2020, this has yet to happen. 
(136) Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. The U.K. formally exited the European Union 
on January 31, 2020. The European Union and the United Kingdom negotiated and concluded a 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which took force January 1, 2021. For the full agreement, see 
The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, 2020 O.J. (L 444) 14–1462, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-
agreement_en. For a brief overview, see Matthias Matthijs, What’s in the EU-UK Brexit Deal?, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-eu-uk-brexit-
deal?gclid=Cj0KCQiA0rSABhDlARIsAJtjfCfD6UsZdZgAn-
LmZ90JJG0FLOKX4xvsQrHXcIYtPGO1SC1MMJF9VksaAgKzEALw_wcB.  
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In August 2019, Prime Minister Johnson met with the Queen to request a 
prorogation of Parliament.(140) Because prorogation of Parliament is a royal prerogative, 
only the Queen (or reigning monarch) may exercise the power, on advice of Privy 
Council.(141) Johnson requested that the Queen prorogue Parliament from no earlier than 
September 9, and no later than September 12, until October 14, leaving Parliament with 
approximately two weeks to reach an agreement before the no-deal Brexit date.(142) 
Prorogation usually receives little fanfare—it is an otherwise unexciting parliamentary 
procedure during which Parliament takes a temporary hiatus from legislating.(143) But it 
is not usually five weeks long.(144) Johnson’s request for prorogation received intense 
backlash from Parliament and the public.(145) Opponents alleged that by asking for such 
a long prorogation in critical weeks leading up to the deadline, Johnson intended to 
“bypass a sovereign Parliament that opposes his policy on Brexit.”(146)  
Challenges to the prorogation were brought in England and Scotland. One court, 
the High Court of Justice for England and Wales, found in Johnson’s favor, ruling that 
the case presented a non-justiciable political question.(147) Whereas, the Scottish appeals 
court rejected the non-justiciability claim and ruled on the merits.(148) The cases were 
consolidated on “leap-frog” appeal to the U.K. Supreme Court as “Miller.”(149) 
The Government argued that the Prime Minister’s prerogative to prorogue 
Parliament, irrespective of the length of the prorogation, presented a nonjusticiable 
political question.(150) Because the Prime Minister is politically accountable to 
Parliament, the Court “should not enter the political arena but should respect the 
separation of powers.”(151) Relying in part on the Divisional Court’s holding, they argued 
that the decision to prorogue Parliament was “inherently political in nature” and that 
“there were no legal standards against which to judge [its] legitimacy.”(152) 
The U.K. Supreme Court was entirely unpersuaded by the Government’s 
argument. In a unanimous decision, the Court repudiated the political question claim 
and reached the merits, holding that the Prime Minister had exceeded the limits of his 
 
(140 Parliament suspension: Queen approves PM’s plan, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-49493632 [hereinafter Parliament suspension]. 
(141) Miller, [2019] UKSC 41, [3].  
(142) Parliament suspension, supra note 140.  
(143) See SARMA, supra note 5.  
(144) See Lengths of Prorogation since 1900, supra note 5.  
(145) See SARMA, supra note 5. 
(146) Parliament suspension, supra note 140 (quoting a statement by Sir John Major, former Prime 
Minister).  
(147) R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB).  
(148) Joanna Cherry QC MP and Others for Judicial Review [2019] CSIH 49. 
(149) [2019] UKSC 41, [25]. 
(150) Id. at [28]. 
(151) Id. 
(152) Id. at [29]. 
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power in requesting a five-week-long prorogation.(153) Responding to the political 
question argument, the Court held that “although the courts cannot decide political 
questions, the fact that a legal dispute concerns the conduct of politicians, or arises from 
a matter of political controversy, has never been sufficient reason for the courts to refuse 
to consider it.”(154) Baroness Hale, writing for the Court, acknowledged the democratic-
accountability argument made by the Prime Minister and dismissed it forcefully: “The 
Prime Minister’s accountability to Parliament does not in itself justify the conclusion that 
the courts have no legitimate role to play.”(155) Hale justified this conclusion for two 
reasons. First, by temporarily dismissing Parliament, prorogation necessarily precludes 
members of Parliament from holding the Prime Minister accountable until Parliament 
has reconvened.(156) Second, political accountability and judicial review are not mutually 
exclusive: “[T]he courts have a duty to give effect to the law, irrespective of the minister’s 
political accountability to Parliament.”(157) A minister’s theoretical political 
accountability to Parliament does not render his actions per se immune from judicial 
review.(158)  
Furthermore, according to Hale, contrary to the Government’s proposition, the 
Court would be giving effect to the separation of powers by ensuring that the 
Government did not unlawfully frustrate Parliament’s proper role in the constitutional 
system.(159) Determining whether a prerogative power exists and defining its scope are 
questions of law—questions that the judiciary is singularly empowered to answer.(160)  
Before it could answer the justiciability question, the Court needed to first 
identify legal standards by which it could evaluate the substantive claims. Although 
prerogative powers are not “constituted by any document,” they must be “compatible 
with common law principles.”(161) In short, “every prerogative power has its limits” and 
it is the Court’s duty to determine where they lie.(162) To identify those limits, the Court 
looked to the constitutional principles of Parliamentary Sovereignty (acts of Parliament 
are supreme and no one is above the law), and Parliamentary Accountability (Ministers 
are held accountable to the electorate by MPs who scrutinize ministerial decisions).(163) 
A prorogation of Parliament would therefore be unlawful if it had “the effect of 
frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to 
 
(153) Id. at [33], [36], [38]. 
(154) Id. at [31].  




(159) Id. at [34].  
(160) Id. at [36].  
(161) Id. at [38].  
(162) Id. 
(163) Id. at [41], [46]. 
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carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the 
supervision of the executive.”(164) Upon successfully identifying legal standards by 
which it could adjudicate the case at bar, the Court determined the case to be 
justiciable.(165)  
On the merits, the Court determined the Prime Minister’s request was unlawful 
because it frustrated or prevented Parliament from exercising its constitutional duty to 
hold the Government accountable on behalf of the people.(166) The Court also inquired 
into Johnson’s purported intent for requesting the prorogation, but was unconcerned 
with his subjective motive for doing so.(167) Instead, it sought to answer an objective 
question: whether there was any reasonable justification for requesting that prorogation 
last five weeks.(168) The Government failed to carry this burden, and the Court concluded 
there was no legitimate reason for the Prime Minister’s actions.(169) Accordingly, the 
Court invalidated the prorogation as unlawful.(170)  
 
 
III. Applying Lessons to the United States Political Question Doctrine 
 
A. Representation Reinforcement Theory & Political System Failures  
According to John Hart Ely, a “political system failure” exists when “the process 
is undeserving of trust” and  
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will 
stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a 
vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically 
disadvantaging some minority out of simply hostility or a prejudiced refusal to 
recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection 
afforded other groups by a representative system.(171)  
 
(164) Id. at [50].  
(165) Id. at [52]. 
(166) Id. at [55–56] (“The first question, therefore, is whether the Prime Minister’s action had the 
effect of frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the Government 
to account. The answer is that of course it did. This was not a normal prorogation in the run-up 
to a Queen’s Speech. It prevented Parliament from carrying out its constitutional role for five out  
of a possible eight weeks between the end of the summer recess and exit day on the 31st 
October.”). 
(167) Id. at [58]. 
(168) Id. 
169 Id. at [59–60].   
170 Id. at [69–70].  
171 J.H. ELY, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 103 (1980). 
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The representation-reinforcement theory advocates that the courts are 
institutionally equipped to—and should—intervene when these failures occur.(172) 
Unlike elected representatives, whose primary goal is to stay in power,(173) federal 
judges, being appointed for life, do not share this concern.(174) This makes judges 
uniquely equipped to decide cases where the political branch is incapable of doing so 
impartially—namely, those cases that “either by clogging the channels of change or by 
acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not 
representing the interests of those whom the system presupposes they are.”(175) When 
the political system malfunctions, judges should operate like referees, stepping in “only 
when one team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the ‘wrong team’ has 
scored.”(176) In practice, this means the courts should adopt an “antitrust” approach and 
intervene when necessary to break up what functionally amounts to an oligarchy.(177) 
Whether it is the executive or the legislature accreting power, under the representation-
reinforcement theory, the courts owe a duty to protect the legitimacy of the political 
processes—including the right to participate meaningfully therein. As Ely put it, 
“unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought 
preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage.”(178)  
 
B. Partisan Gerrymandering and Prorogation as Political System Failures 
Partisan gerrymandering is a paradigmatic example of a political system failure. 
Although gerrymandering does not literally prevent people from voting—people can 
still cast their votes at the ballot box—it deprives certain votes of any real effect. With 
partisan gerrymandering, the political party in power draws voting districts to maintain 
their majority position. “Minority” party voters are either “packed” into a single district, 
diluting their power in surrounding districts to the advantage of the “majority,” or 
“cracked” across several districts so that in each one, they will be outnumbered.(179) 
These methods ensure that the outcome is all but decided before election day. In 
gerrymandered districts, popular elections are tainted by partisan interference, and thus 
the political process is undeserving of trust. Because partisan redistricting efforts draw 
 
172 Id. at 102–03. 
173 Id. at 78. 
174 Id. at 103. 
175 Id. at 103. 
176 Id. at 103. 
177 Id. at 102–03. Ely does not define oligarchy, so we will assume its ordinary meaning applies. 
An oligarchy is “a government in which a small group exercises control especially for corrupt or 
selfish purposes.” Oligarchy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/oligarchy (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
178 J. H. ELY, supra note 171, at 117.  
179 See M. WINES, What is Gerrymandering? And Why Did the Supreme Court Rule on It?, N.Y. Times 
(June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/what-is-gerrymandering.html. 
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electoral maps to dilute the voting power of partisan opponents, “choking off the 
channels of political change to ensure that [the incumbents] will stay in and the outs will 
stay out,” they are a primary example of a political system failure.(180) The majority party, 
even if it lacks the majority of popular votes in a given jurisdiction, draws the districts 
to entrench itself in power—debasing the political process and detrimentally impacting 
constituents.  
Illegitimate prorogation, too, fits Ely’s definition nicely. Again, the process does 
not merit the public’s trust. In Miller, the Prime Minister sought to circumvent the 
traditional political process of —Parliamentary deliberation and bicameral approval—
by dismissing Parliament in the final weeks before the deadline and forcing their hand 
into a no-deal Brexit for purely partisan gain.(181) Like partisan gerrymandering, 
Johnson’s prorogation falls under Ely’s first category. But it differs from gerrymandering 
because voters are not directly affected. However, as Miller concluded, the unlawful 
prorogation prevented their elected representatives from holding the PM accountable 
and from exercising Parliamentary checks on executive power.(182) And Prime Minister 
Johnson called the prorogation to do just that: there was no other reasonable explanation 
for it.(183) And, as the Court found, frustrating the constitutional balance of powers is not 
a reasonable justification, and contravenes the foundational principles of Britain’s 
representative democracy.  
In both cases, political actors have seriously degraded the proper functioning of 
the political process so as to deprive of its legitimacy. In both cases, the process itself is 
undeserving of trust and requires judicial intervention. 
 
C. Reenvisioning the U.S. Doctrine: The Search for Manageable Standards  
Miller is consistent with the representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review. 
In Miller, the United Kingdom Supreme Court recognized that the political channels had 
malfunctioned. Prime Minister Johnson’s government had sought to circumvent the 
political process and amass undue power for itself. As a result, Johnson’s prorogation 
deprived Parliament of its opportunity to participate in negotiations and express its 
dissent with a no-deal Brexit. The prorogation also frustrated the public’s opportunity 
to have its interests meaningfully represented in Parliament. The Court recognized that 
both of these consequences amounted to political system failures, contravening the 
U.K.’s constitutional principles of democratic accountability and separation of 
 
180 ELY, supra note 171, at 103. 
181 See Parliament suspension, supra note 140 (quoting House of Commons Speaker John Bercow 
who said, “However it is dressed up, it is blindingly obvious that the purpose of [suspending 
Parliament] now would be to stop [MPs] debating Brexit and performing its duty in shaping a 
course for the country.” (alterations in original)).  
182 Miller, [2019] UKSC 41, [56–57]. 
183 Id. at [58–61].  
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powers.(184) The Court deemed it necessary to intervene to reset the power balance and 
ensure that the people’s will would be represented in Parliament without undue 
inhibition by the Executive. And the Court intervened without risking its own 
legitimacy: if anything, the Court was widely regarded as more legitimate for upholding 
its constitutional duty and protecting individual liberties from government 
infringement.(185) The sky did not fall.; the world did not end. Instead, Parliament and 
British government returned to functioning normally.(186) 
The judicially manageable standards provided in Miller could serve as the basis 
for a test to adjudicate U.S. partisan gerrymandering claims. In determining whether 
prorogation was unlawful, the Miller Court sought to identify (1) the actual effects of 
prorogation and (2) a legitimate government interest in the prorogation, with the 
government bearing the burden of proof.(187) Similarly, in partisan gerrymandering 
claims, the U.S. Supreme Court should ask the following questions: (1) Does the electoral 
map have the effect of substantially frustrating constituents’ participation in the political 
processes because of their political affiliation? And (2) did the legislature, if acting 
without a partisan motive, have a legitimate reason to draw the lines in the way it did, 
with the government bearing the burden of proof? This showing can be rebutted by 
evidence of subjective intent and facially-neutral evidence (like irregular district shapes 
and mathematical analysis), but these are not required to make a prima facie case. 
Miller’s objective-intent standard would remedy challenges with previous U.S. 
Supreme Court tests, which required proof of subjective intent. In all but the most 
extreme cases, like Rucho, collective subjective intent is extraordinarily difficult for 
challengers to prove. Miller was entirely unconcerned with actual motive.(188) Likewise, 
partisan gerrymandering claims should not require a showing of subjective intent. 
Instead, challengers can more easily prove an objective standard, thereby ensuring 
greater protection of the right to participate equally in the political process. The right to 
vote is the most fundamental exercise of individual liberty. Representation-
reinforcement theory demands that courts protect the sanctity and legitimacy of political 
processes. An objective-intent standard does just that: government motives are subject 
to more exacting scrutiny.  
Furthermore, a burden-shifting framework better protects individual liberties 
and the sanctity of the political process. Before Rucho, plaintiffs bore the entire burden 
in partisan gerrymandering suits. But under this test, they would need to prove only 
discriminatory impact—that members of a given party’s votes are substantially deprived 
 
(184) Id. at [51].  




(187) See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
(188) Miller, [2019] UKSC 41, [58]; see also supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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of value in popular elections—in order to make a prima facie case. Upon this showing, 
the Court will ask whether it is reasonable to believe the map would have been drawn 
the same way, absent partisan gamesmanship. It then becomes the government’s burden 
to put on evidence of legitimate reasons for drawing the electoral map in the way it did.  
As in pre-Rucho caselaw, challengers can rebut the government’s justification by 
putting on additional evidence: irregular district shapes, any legislative history to 
demonstrate subjective intent, and mathematical analysis of the chosen map to 
demonstrate, for example, how much of an outlier it is and how significantly it dilutes 
the votes of partisan opponents.(189) In short, the farther away the map is from neutral 
center, the greater the showing of disparate impact and partisan intent. It is critical that 
the government bear the burden because this provides greater protections to voters. 
This test would have caught the North Carolina and Maryland maps at issue in 
Rucho. First, voters in both states (Democrats in one and Republicans in the other) 
demonstrated that their votes were systematically deprived of meaningful effect. For 
example, in 2012, Republicans in North Carolina won nine of the state’s thirteen 
Congressional districts (that’s nearly 75 percent of the seats), despite only winning only 
49 percent of the statewide vote.(190) A disparity margin of 25 percent would qualify as 
a substantial frustration. And second, the states did not claim a non-partisan reason for 
constructing the districts in the manner they did. Even if they had, it would have been 
difficult to justify Maryland’s flipping of the First District as anything other than sheer 
partisan gain.(191) Evidence of the map’s mathematical value, the redistricting 
committees’ flagrantly discriminatory subjective intent, and possibly irregular district 
shapes would have successfully rebutted this argument. This test would capture the 
worst cases without overreaching and would be easily administrable. 
Finally, the Miller court’s judicially manageable standards and those proposed 
here closely resemble those announced in Justice Kagan’s dissent.(192) There, Kagan and 
the lower courts had looked for effect, intent, and causation.(193) In Miller, the Court 
looked for effects and objective intent.(194) All of these principles are represented in the 
test I propose. This reaffirms Justice Kagan’s point that judicially manageable standards 
 
(189) See Brief for Political Science Professors, infra note 207.  
(190) See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2510 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
(191) Id. at 2510–11.  
(192) Id. at 2516. 
(193) See id.; see also Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 852 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (“[U]nder the 
standard on which we rely on to strike down those twelve districts, a state legislative body may 
engage in some degree of partisan gerrymandering, so long as it was not predominantly 
motivated by invidious partisan considerations.”); Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 524 (D. 
Md. 2018) (ruling that plaintiffs’ First Amendment Association rights were unduly burdened by 
Maryland’s gerrymandering scheme).  
(194) Miller, [2019] UKSC at [55–56], [58]. 
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do exist, and indeed, the lower courts had worked with them all along.(195) Further still, 
a constitutional system across the pond crafted judicially manageable standards, 
predicated on democratic accountability and institutional competence, that could apply 
reasonably well to partisan gerrymandering claims, puts the Rucho court’s willful 
blindness on full display.  
 
D. Responding to Anticipated Critiques 
Critics will likely mount four primary objections. First, proving subjective intent 
is a Herculean task and objective intent leaves too much room for judicial activism. 
Second, this proposal does not remedy the “textual hook” problem: it fails to provide a 
standard tied to constitutional text. Third, the inquiry does not provide a bright line for 
determining when a state has gone too far. And fourth, allowing partisan 
gerrymandering claims to be adjudicated will open the floodgates of litigation.  
First, objectors may disagree with the decision to include an intent inquiry at all. 
Subjective intent is challenging to prove in most cases (although it would have been 
quite easy in Rucho).(196) That is why, as seen in Miller, an objective standard should be 
adopted with the government bearing the burden of proof. Dissenters to this approach 
will likely argue that an objective-intent standard leaves too much room for courts to 
make policy decisions and impose their own notions of fairness.(197) But courts conduct 
this type of inquiry all the time without being tempted to impose their own values. 
Rational basis review is functionally an objective intent inquiry: whether the government 
could have had a rational justification for making the policy choice it did.(198) The 
objective intent standard proposed here seeks to answer the same question.  
Second, Rucho relies in part on the argument that there is no textual hook in the 
Constitution which prescribes judicially manageable standards to adjudicate partisan 
gerrymandering claims.(199) It is true that the Constitution does not explicitly address 
proportional representation or gerrymandering, so naturally the objective-intent 
standard does not seek guidance from text that does not exist. Instead, the Equal 
Protection Clause provides sufficient guidance: the state shall not “deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”(200) But in any event, this critique 
is beside the point. The entirety of equal protection jurisprudence is judicially created. 
 
(195) Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2516. 
(196) Id. at 2522 (“Although purpose inquiries carry certain hazards (which courts must attend to), 
they are a common form of analysis in constitutional cases.” (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
916 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).  
(197) See id. at 2499–500 (Roberts, C.J.) (noting that a “clear, manageable and politically neutral” 
test is necessary to “meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts”) (citation omitted).  
(198) See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
(199) Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2499–500. 
(200) U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
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The tiers of scrutiny, for example, have no textual grounding in the Constitution. And 
though some have argued that they are unconstitutional for that reason,(201) their status 
as accepted constitutional doctrine seems safe for now. Similarly, nowhere in the text of 
the Constitution is the “one person, one vote” standard prescribed—yet courts regularly 
adjudicate those claims on the merits.(202) Merely because a standard is not explicitly 
provided for in the Constitution does not mean that one cannot exist. Otherwise, this 
line of reasoning would have dire implications for the entire body of equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
Third, critics will argue that the effects and objective intent test is not a bright-
line rule. This is true. But in that way, it is consistent with the body of equal protection 
jurisprudence: equal protection claims are case-by-case, fact-specific inquiries. An 
analogy is helpful here: apportionment, or “one person, one vote,” claims are justiciable. 
How is determining whether one vote means less than another any different in the 
context of partisan gerrymandering? Chief Justice Roberts contends that unlike partisan 
gerrymandering claims, the “one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer 
as a matter of math.”(203) However, as Justice Kagan notes in dissent, these “are not your 
grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”(204) Improved technology and 
increased access to data have fundamentally changed the way mapmakers craft districts: 
powerful computing technology allows mapmakers to craft thousands of options for 
district maps and to predict the electoral outcome of each with unprecedented 
precision.(205) Taken together, legislators can choose maps with near certainty of their 
result.(206) New technology can assign mathematical values to the maps and place them 
along the spectrum, relative to the other options.(207) Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s 
belief, it is mathematically possible to demonstrate when the state has gone too far.(208) 
Admittedly, this test does not draw a clear line in the sand, but this does not render the 
test unadministrable. Because it is possible to quantify a given map’s “score” compared 
 
(201) See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (“The illegitimacy of using ‘made-up tests’ to ‘displace longstanding national 
traditions as the primary determinant of what the Constitution means’ has long been apparent. 
The Constitution does not prescribe tiers of scrutiny. The three basic tiers—‘rational basis,’ 
intermediate, and strict scrutiny—‘are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further 
element of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be applied 
in each case.’” (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567, 570, (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting))).  
(202) Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2501. 
(203) Id. 
(204) Id. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
(205) Id. 
(206) Id. 
(207) Brief for Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 22–25, Rucho v. 
Common Cause, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (Nos. 18-422, 18-726).  
(208) Id.  
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to alternatives, the farther outside the range of standard deviation it is, the more 
suspicious it will be. Like the entire body of equal protection jurisprudence, these cases 
must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis giving great weight to the facts. 
And finally, challengers will likely pose the time-immemorial “floodgates of 
litigation” argument. Of course, it is true that allowing federal courts to adjudicate 
partisan gerrymandering claims will increase litigation, given the current baseline is 
zero. This of itself should not be viewed as a problem. First, depriving citizens of their 
right to have an equal impact on an election solely on the basis of political affiliation is a 
constitutional violation.(209) They demand a remedy, and the courts stand well-equipped 
to provide it. Partisan gerrymandering is a longstanding and widespread problem that 
denigrates the political process. Merely because gerrymandering existed at the time of 
the nation’s birth does not make it constitutionally permissible. Slavery and racial 
discrimination were also permitted at the founding, and we rightfully outlawed those 
practices long ago. In short, the right to equal impact in the political process outweighs 
concerns of increased litigation. Second, this test still requires challengers to satisfy the 
elements of the offense—including showing discriminatory impact. It will only undo 
those districts which substantially frustrate citizens’ participation in the political 





When a branch of government impinges on individual liberties and obstructs 
processes necessary for legitimate representative democracy, it is the duty and the 
province of courts to intervene. Political system failures mean that the political processes 
cannot themselves return to equilibrium without help. And it is precisely because the 
political branches have no incentive to constrain themselves that the courts must 
intervene. Miller demonstrates that courts can do so without falling victim to the 
“political thicket,” and that judicially manageable standards exist for adjudicating 
constitutional claims in political system failures. Miller illustrates why Rucho got it 
wrong. 
Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s assertions, partisan gerrymandering is not a 
legitimate state interest. Something so antithetical to representative democracy is 
undeserving of the Court’s sanction. In Miller, the United Kingdom Supreme Court did 
what the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to do—it recognized that the political 
process was not working properly. The same plague afflicts both nations: constitutional 
democracies under siege by the very people who have sworn to protect them. One has 
diagnosed the problem and administered a cure. The other has left the problem 
untreated, allowing the virus to continue spreading. In political system failures, the long-
 
(209) Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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term health of democracy becomes uncertain, but intervention substantially increases 
the likelihood of survival.  
The United States Supreme Court in Rucho purportedly grounds its blind-eyed 
position in democratic legitimacy: the Court, as a typically antimajoritarian figure must 
refrain from intervening in political issues. The irony is that the Court, in tethering itself 
to its notion of democratic legitimacy, has undermined the very institution it purports 
to protect. The United States Supreme Court ignores the reality of the problem.  
American democracy is predicated on the idea that the government derives its 
power from the people. Partisan gerrymandering deprives voters of the right to 
participate meaningfully in our representative democracy. And when the electorate can 
no longer express its dissent through the normal channel—the political process—only 
the courts remain as the last line of defense. It is essential to the proper functioning of a 
democracy that voters are able to voice their dissent through the political process. 
Without checks on state power through judicial review, democracy itself will succumb 
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